Analysing Parliamentary Behaviour in European Union Affairs

The European Union (EU) has evolved from a regulatory agency into a polity that shapes all areas of public policy-making including salient domains such as energy policy, domestic security and fiscal policy (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs forthcoming). In this context, it has become hard to avoid the question as to how European integration affects existing democratic practices and institutions of the member states (e.g. Schmidt 2006). One prominent strand of research has focused on whether national parliaments and parliamentary actors lose relevance or whether they are able to adjust to the EU. This literature has paid particular attention to the description and analysis of formal rules and procedures that might help parliaments to monitor and influence European level policy-making (e.g. Bergman 1997; Raunio 2005; Winzen 2013). In recent years, however, it has become widely accepted that the analysis of formal rules tells us too little about how parliaments and parliamentary actors really behave in relation to the EU. Moreover, the question as to whether parliaments are the losers of integration tells us little about the conditions and mechanisms that explain parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Pollak and Slominski 2003; Auel 2007; Raunio 2009). Only a few studies of various forms of parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs exist so far (notably Holzhacker 2002; Auel 2007; de Ruiter 2013; Finke and Dannwolf 2013; Wonka and Rittberger 2013; Auel and Raunio 2014). In addition, to our knowledge, several research projects are ongoing or about to start that analyse different types of EU-related parliamentary behaviour. The new provisions on national parliaments in the Lisbon Treaty are likely to increase scholarly interest further in the coming years. Thus, we believe that it is the right moment to bring together scholars working in this field in an effort to clarify the contours of this emerging research agenda.