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The Party-Networks of National MPs in EU Politics: Compensation for Weaknesses at Home?

Parliaments
Political Parties
European Union
Mette Buskjær Christensen
Department of Political Science & Public Management, University of Southern Denmark
Mette Buskjær Christensen
Department of Political Science & Public Management, University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

If we consider that EU is a two-track parliamentary system characterized as a ‘multi-level parliamentary field’, we lack empirical knowledge about how different parliamentary levels are linked. This article turns to the vertical structure of the field by exploring inter-parliamentary contacts between national parliaments and the European parliament. It takes the perspective of national parliaments and maps out the nature, scope and density of MPs multi-level strategies. It does so by developing a novel research framework, which aims at mapping out the networks that link members of European Affairs Committees (EACs) to other MPs and MEPs through party groups. Social network analysis is applied as it provides new insights to the non-institutionalized and informal aspects of parliamentary behavior by interpreting national MPs involvement in EU affairs in light of their varying positions within the social network structure of political parties. The paper is the first to present data on networks of national MPs involved in EU affairs and contribute to our understanding of how representational deficits at the national level may be compensated for through party networks. Towards this purpose, two diverse cases have been selected representing two outer points in previous rankings of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. The EAC of the Danish Folketing often referred to as the ‘best practice’ example representing a strong institutionalization of EU affairs – and the EAC of the Spanish Cortes Generales often characterized as a ‘weak scrutinizer’ and ‘slow adaptor’ to European integration.