Imperfect Duties and Political Theory

Abstract

This panel discusses the ways in which the concept of imperfect (vs perfect) duties functions in and engages with political theory and political philosophy. A number of claims have been made including: that justice does not primarily correspond to imperfect duties, but rather perfect duties; that human rights can or cannot correspond to imperfect obligations to fulfill those rights; that imperfect duties can/should be consolidated where possible into perfect duties where this will more efficiently achieve a goal (such as alleviating global poverty). Traditionally imperfect duties have been associated with obligations of charity or assistance, or obligations of private agents in the private sphere, yet this is now regularly challenged. New theories of harms and systemic injustice have also appealed to imperfect rather than perfect duties as the appropriate remedies for political actors. Can imperfect duties serve a political role, rather than just fit into personal or private morality? There are a number of conceptual questions about the definition of imperfect duties and their distinction from perfect duties, and their role if any in political theory, and this panel aims explore these and related questions.

Title	Details
No Consolidation: Why Imperfect Duties Cannot be Converted into Perfect Ones	View Paper Details
The Impossibility of Converting Imperfect to Perfect Duties	View Paper Details
In Need of Conceptual Clarification – Imperfect Duties, Perfect Duties and Rights	View Paper Details
An Analysis of The Nature of The Duties Imposed by Systemic Human Rights Violations	View Paper Details