Government Formation, Coalition Dynamics and Cabinet Termination

Abstract

In parliamentary democracies, elections distribute the seats in parliament, but who gets into government and determines the policy agenda over the legislative term is decided after elections in negotiations between the political parties. In this respect, structural attributes of the political system such as parliamentary fragmentation and polarization, the presence of non-coalitionable political parties; as well as institutional rules and arrangements, may either provide significant leeway or may seriously constrain political parties in forming sustainable (coalition) cabinets. Once a cabinet is formed these features may also affect the management of government policy in the legislative arena and its ability to implement a policy agenda. This panel is dedicated to theoretical and empirical work that advances our understanding of coalition dynamics on this issues. Topics of interest, thus, include how political institutions (or constitutions), the parliamentary arena and the electoral arena affects cabinet formation, coalition bargaining, cabinet governance (under minority situations), and cabinet duration. In addition, we are interested in work that looks at the impact of cabinet dynamics on public policy making.

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