Presidents and Legislation: Policy-making and the Consequences of Presidential Veto Power

Abstract

Presidents’ legislative veto power has traditionally attracted great scholarly attention and researchers have been able to identify common predictors of its use across political systems. This research now provides the basis for a shift of scholarly focus from explaining general patterns of presidential veto use to more bill-specific models of presidential involvement in the legislative process. However, the actual consequences of presidential veto power and other prerogatives on specific policies and the policy-making process as a whole remain under-researched. Furthermore, presidential involvement in the policy-process is not limited to veto power but includes a great number of other presidential and parliamentary prerogatives that deserve greater attention – both individually and from a comparative perspective. This panel consists of five papers presenting cutting-edge research on presidential veto power and presidents’ involvement in the legislative process and policy-making from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives. Contributions range from empirical investigations into the use of presidential vetoes in Latvia and Poland, an analysis of presidential signing statements and congressional oversight in the United States, to an assessment of presidential foreign policy decision-making powers in Armenia, and a comparative analysis of the effect of presidential vetoes and parliamentary response options on the power balance between president and legislature. As such, all papers address the overall topic of the panel: Policy-making and the consequences of presidential veto power.