The Bureaucratic Politics of Expert Advice

Abstract

Scholars of public administration and political science have taken interest in the delegation of tasks and powers to ‘bureaucratic experts’ in the permanent civil service for decades. In present-day policymaking, however, policy advice is increasingly provided not only by bureaucratic actors but also by external actors such as consultancy firms, think tanks, academics, technocrats and experts of various sorts. This development raises several interesting questions related to why and when politico-administrative principals consult external experts, as well as questions regarding the autonomy and control of expert input. This panel seeks to shed light on policy advisory activity delegated to external experts and ‘semi-independent’ bodies such as expert groups and inquiry commissions. It includes papers addressing the following questions: How do political and bureaucratic actors control external expert advice? How do politico-administrative variables affect the choice of expertise provider and the use of advice? And how does this affect policies?