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Building: (Building D) Faculty of Law, Administration & Economics , Floor: 2nd floor, Room: 2.04
Friday 11:00 - 12:40 CEST (06/09/2019)
The extent to which the independence of international organizations (IOs) and their bureaucracies is constrained by the national interests of member states is a central topic in international relations. To considerable degree, this debate has focused on a principal-agent relationship between states and IOs, where states design institutions and delegate authority to them. There is, however, an emerging literature that seeks to broaden this scholarship to include both non-traditional channels of delegation—such as through other agencies—and the role of informal power within IOs and the actors who wield it. This panel invites papers exploring issues of design and decision making through a variety of methodological and conceptual approaches.
Title | Details |
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The European Patent Office: Agent Without Principals? | View Paper Details |
Institutional Design for a Post-Liberal Order: Why Some International Organisations Live Longer Than Others | View Paper Details |
The Design of International Organisations | View Paper Details |
Russia in the SCO: The Story of a Changing Attitude | View Paper Details |
Managing the Principal? How UN Development Agencies Push-Back Against Earmarking | View Paper Details |