Extensive literature indicates that the European Union has almost unlimited resources for negative integration. This is based on the argument that there are asymmetries towards liberalisation in the treaties, the European Court of Justice may interpret the treaty provisions broadly and the European Commission uses the legal basis to aggressively have its way. As such, this allows supranational institutions to bypass the roles of the Council and the European Parliament in legislation or “nudge” them to compromise. This happens for regulatory policies in the single market, but also in areas of core state powers such as taxation and social policy. Based on an analysis of three transport and communications services, I argue that existing literature fails to acknowledge important explanations. Such explanations include the willingness of the European Commission to modify legislative drafts as endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council, the ability of labour unions to mobilise at the European level as well as new technology and the increased competition that such innovations impose on different sectors. As a means to address such concerns, I compare the following three cases: (1) the Third Postal Services Directive, which ended a series of directives by liberalising the remaining letter policies; (2) the Public Passenger Transport Services Regulation as a middling case; and (3) the Port Package, in which the attempts of liberalisation reform have been rejected. Being public services that are vital for people’s everyday life, they provide a useful basis for exploring how economic and social interests as well as national and supranational institutions play out in European Union decision-making processes.
