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Parliamentary Institutions and the Governing Capacity of Minority Parliamentary Governments: The Case of Spain

Comparative Politics
Government
Parliaments
Political Parties
Institutions
Bonnie N Field
Bentley University
Bonnie N Field
Bentley University

Abstract

Parliamentary institutions, particularly the positive or negative nature of the investiture vote and the strength of parliamentary committees, are hypothesized to encourage the formation of minority governments. This paper, as part of a larger project, evaluates the effect of parliamentary institutions on the governing capacity of minority governments in Spain. Scholars have mentioned but not frequently analyzed the importance of the majorities necessary for decision making in parliament, the government’s agenda setting powers, and censure rules (Helland 2004; Herman and Pope 1973; Strøm 1990; Tsebelis 2002) for minority governments’ effectiveness. Based on an analysis of the four minority governments in Spain after 1993, the paper argues that parliamentary institutions, as written or because they are used strategically, bolster governing capacity because they both strengthen the bargaining power of governments and create incentives for some opposition parties to collaborate with the government. Several institutions strengthen the bargaining power of governments in Spain, including the electoral laws’ majoritarian biases, the constructive vote of no confidence, strong governmental agenda-setting powers and effective thresholds for decision-making that often fall below an absolute majority. The paper demonstrates that minority governments take advantage of the institutional tools at their disposal more than majority governments, and the number of abstention votes is higher in the former, suggesting the importance of both. Institutions can also heighten smaller parties’ incentives to collaborate with the government, and reduce the potential costs of doing so, thereby bolstering the minority government’s ability to assure allies. In Spain, the institutional rules allow parties to provide more opaque support for the government if they fear their voters could view explicit support negatively. Specifically, parties can cast abstention votes, which typically favor the government, and support the government in committees when committees are delegated the competence to approve legislation without a floor vote.