The creation of the International Criminal Court, a permanent institution established with the purpose of ending impunity for those that committed crimes of genocide, grave breaches in the law of war or crimes again humanity in cases in which national judicial systems are unwilling or unable to act, despite its temporal limitations and the lack of universal jurisdiction, has been regarded by many as “a truly historic event”.
One of the most important features of the ICC is its permanent nature, which reflects the will to “ensure that genocide and other such crimes against humanity should no longer go unpunished” and to “deter future war criminals and bring nearer the day when no ruler, no state, no junta and no army will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.” The two auspices combined make for a far-reaching task, and quite a taller one than that the ICTY and the ICTR faced: not only that of holding individuals accountable, regardless of their rank, but also one of prevention. The latter issue raises the question: can the ICC be considered a means to change the international law regime in regard to this kind of crimes, or is it rather the outcome of such a shift in the political will of the international community?
This paper argues that it has worked both ways: while there was general agreement that an independent, permanent criminal court was needed, once established, the tribunal—as often happens with international organizations— has become an autonomous body that exists in large part independently of the states that are part of it, and has helped significantly in shaping states’ (both those that are a part to the treaty and those who oppose it) perception of legitimacy and compliance with international criminal law.
