Cooperation or Circumvention? When do Governments in the European Multi-level system cooperate with their Domestic Opponents and when do they prefer to circumvent them via the European Level?

Various authors have argued that the European Union strengthens the power of executives vis-à-vis other domestic actors. According to this line of reasoning, governments can circumvent their domestic opponents by shifting decision-making to the European level. Case studies in different policy areas have demonstrated that governments do indeed pursue such circumvention strategies. Circumvention, however, is not the only strategy governments can employ when faced with domestic opposition (here defined as many domestic veto players who are willing to block the government’s agenda). They can also cooperate with the veto players and win their support by means of concessions. Both strategies are theoretically plausible. Up until now, however, there have been no systematic investigations of the conditions under which the strategies are pursued. Therefore, I ask: When do governments cooperate with domestic veto players and when do they circumvent them via the European level? My investigation finds its origins and focus within the assumption that that the strategies are related to the institutionally determined dispersion of power. To answer my research question I apply a comparative research design, analyzing governmental strategies in Great Britain, France, and Germany - countries that vary regarding the institutional dispersion of power. Within these countries I compare the governments’ behavior in situations that differ with regards to veto players’ interest to control governmental activities. The objective of this comparison is to specify the conditions under which each strategy becomes likely or unlikely. In doing so, I contribute to the research on the strategies that political actors develop to deal with a strong dispersion of power. Additionally, by investigating whether the governments’ interest in strengthening the European level can be partly explained by domestic institutional factors, I contribute to existing domestic politics research on European integration.