Democratisation in Burma in a Comparative Perspective

This paper aspires to achieve two interrelated goals. First, the paper will discuss strategies employed by the Burmese government to make it clear how it strives to limit the electoral prospects of the opposition and keep it fragmented, and as it tries to utilize entities like proxy parties, ethnic minorities and their representatives, or the groups in the opposition that are dissatisfied with the dominant role of NLD (National League for Democracy) to prevent the power shift from happening. I will also try to show which strategies, on the other hand, can be pursued by the opposition to balance the military and economic preponderance of the government – e.g. primarily an obvious necessity to get united but also not so much obvious steps like addressing individuals and groups in the military to make them switch their (political) allegiance, to built up countermeasures to face divisive tactics by the government, or to make an efficient use of the international community and of the interest of the government to draw economic benefits. Second, a comparative approach is needed if we really want to understand what steps and tools are (not) applicable in the Burmese transition, and what lessons the Burmese opposition should learn (to reinforce their chances to succeed) or can even give (for others to see what can(not) work under various conditions). Here, examples of successful and (more or less) failed transitions would be given – Central Europe, Indonesia, Brazil but also Ukraine and Egypt – to show which practices can(not) be utilized in Burma and what successes and failures can be most expected in Burmese transition.