Agenda setting rules are among the theoretically most central institutional rules in parliaments as they structure both decision-making and the ways in which parliamentary actors can create parliamentary publicity for issues they want to emphasize in public debate. In comparative perspective, the current rules in the Bundestag provide for a rather balanced distribution of agenda setting rights between parliamentary majority and minority and allow little formal interference from outside actors, especially members of the cabinet. This institutional constellation is usually explained with reference to historical factors, the structure of the party system, and the overall institutional configuration in a consensus democracy.
What is missing in this picture, however, is a temporally dynamic perspective. Even on the descriptive level, we lack systematic data on how agenda setting rules in the Bundestag have changed over time and how the institutional balance of power between different actors may have shifted. This paper uses a unique database of all versions of parliamentary standing orders from 1949 until today to trace the development of agenda setting rules in the Bundestag. Furthermore, it seeks an explanation of observed trends building both on previous claims in the specific literature on the Bundestag and more general explanations of institutional change in parliaments.
