The legitimacy of representative democracy depends on electoral accountability. Elected representatives have a dual role; they are expected to promote particular interests but also to act as impartial deliberators. Although representative institutions are to some degree designed to enhance impartial reasoning, specific institutional arrangements may be needed to foster such reasoning, especially when it comes to decisions with far-fetched consequences. There seems to be at least three different strategies for this: first, encouraging impartial reasoning among representatives; second, delegating the task of deliberating to ‘independent’ actors; third, organizing more inclusive forms of deliberation, e.g. deliberative mini-publics. This paper explores institutional arrangements through which impartial reasoning can be enhanced. The paper also examines ‘deliberative agenda-setting’, that is, institutional arrangements which help to identify those situations and issues which especially call for impartial reasoning. Finally, some remarks are made on the relationship between impartiality and legitimacy.
