Procuring Peace after Prolonging War: International Institutions and the Durations of International Conflict and Post-Conflict Peace

How do international organizations (IOs) influence states' conflict behavior in the absence of centralized enforcement? This study develops and tests a theory about how IO membership helps solve the enforcement problems states face in the aftermath of a militarized conflict. It argues that joint membership in IOs that explicitly promote peaceful settlement of disputes improves enforcement conditions by increasing the costs of cease-fire violation in the long run. As a result, these IOs make a cease-fire more durable once the disputants agree to stop fighting. However, precisely because they expect longer peace after conflict, the member states have incentives to adopt tougher bargaining positions during conflict, causing a delay in reaching a cease-fire. A survival analysis that recognizes the interdependence between the durations of conflict and subsequent peace demonstrates that IO membership lengthens both the duration of conflict and the duration of subsequent peace.