Merchants of Death, Mediators, and International Conflict: Arms Transfers Effect on Conflict Management and Conflict Outcomes

A large body of literature exists that examines mediation affecting the duration of international conflict and conflict outcome, but there is limited research on how arms transfers affect conflict processes. The relationship between arms transfers and mediation poses interesting questions because an influx or reduction of arms can affect negotiations by shifting balances of power. Overall, 44% of violent MIDs receive mediation offers and 27% accept mediation from any given state, while 47% receive arms from one of the P5 Security Council members, let alone smaller suppliers. Additionally, a state external to the conflict has the ability to be a mediator and an arms supplier at the same time, which occurs in 10% of violent MIDs when only examining P5 members as the supplier. In this paper, I address this lacuna by examining the effect of transfers of major weapon systems into violent MIDs on conflict duration and outcome. I argue that arms transfers on will increase the length of international conflict, but I caveat this by taking into account when mediation is occurring and the existing relationships. An interaction between mediation and arms imports should reduce the length of the conflict and lead to a negotiated settlement.