Why (Still) Vote for Europe? Collective Memories, Multiple Identities and Shifting Loyalties

Whereas ‘ Euroscepticism’ has always been around in Europe, the so-called ‘Democratic Deficit’ only emerged after the 1990s. Apart from a few member-states there is no compulsory voting in Europe. Since the 1970s one can observe a downward trend in Voters’ Turnout and simultaneously higher levels of Electoral Volatility on the national and European level. Together with the rise of new (often Euroskeptic) parties in many polities, these developments can account for these changes in voting behaviour and subsequent effects in terms of support and the legitimacy of Europe. In this paper my focus will be mainly at EP elections (but compared with national trends). I claim that there are other causes of the change in voting behaviour than is usually employed in election studies: collective memories of war and pre-war poverty, forms of multiple identity like regionalism & old and new cleavages, and other socio-cultural shifts within age cohorts of the electorate. Using a distinction between 'emotional' and 'utility' motives for voting I will demonstrate that the shifts over time re. the changes in support for Europe are also embedded in the national and regional ‘histories’ of the member-states included in my comparative analysis . I also claim that this analysis will show that in addition to de-alignment also re-alignment (often to new parties) is occurring and why. The analysis is comparative employing empirical evidence of 15 member-states (up to the inclusion of 1995: Austria - Belgium – Denmark - Finland - France - Germany – Greece – Italy – Ireland – Luxembourg – Netherlands – Portugal – Spain – Sweden – United Kingdom) covering a long-term perspective. My principal aim is to explore to what extent the potential causes mentioned above have indeed contributed to the changes in attitude towards the EU.