Anti-Corruption Without a Political Will: Horizontal and Diagonal Mechanisms to Combat Corruption

The paper examines how institutional and legal factors contribute to diminish corruption even against political will. Its basic claim is that it is possible to reduce corruption even if the political elite are not committed to integrity in government. It underscores the role of state legitimacy, on the one hand, and of entrepreneurs, on the other hand. One of the challenges to anti-corruption activities and policies is that most of their costs are associated with countering the work of a small number of powerful, corrupt agents, but the average person may see few benefits from these expenditures. In addition, anti-corruption policies may face the challenge of structural incentives for corruption, habits and systemic corruption. As a result, there may often be significant resistance to anti-corruption activities and policies, and support for these efforts may be weak. As Wilson (1980: 370) stated, when the benefits are distributed and the costs are concentrated, entrepreneurial politics is required. Despite increased research into both the issue of entrepreneurship and anti-corruption, the link between these two areas has not yet been established. The article emphasizes the importance of entrepreneurs in the anti-corruption arena. The paper distinguishes between horizontal (intra-governmental) entrepreneurs and diagonal (societal, in which non-state actors are instrumental) entrepreneurs, and how they can work to reduce corruption despite lack of political will, and lack of vertical (electoral) accountability. Using in depth interviews and a content analysis of press articles and judicial decisions, I demonstrate on theoretical framework on several anti-corruption activities in Israel. References Wilson, James. Q. 1980. "The Politics of Regulation", in: J. Q. Wilson (ed.) The Politics of Regulation, New York: Basic Books, 319–36.