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Collective Bureaucratic Memories and Policy Over-Reactions: Policy Integration in the European Commission

Public Administration
Public Policy
Institutions
European Union
Jale Tosun
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
Achim Lang
Universität Konstanz
Claudio Radaelli
European University Institute
Jale Tosun
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Abstract

Surprisingly for a bureaucracy often accused of formulating policy in silos, during the last decade the European Commission has adopted a full range of approaches to cross-sectoral policy integration. Policy integration – albeit discussed under a whole range of different labels – is prescribed in fields as diverse as climate change, gender, health and development. In this paper we address the following questions: when does the Commission implement measures for more integrated policies? Can it be considered an over-reaction to exogenous pressures rather than adequate problem-solving? Is this turn accompanied by a relatively coherent approach? How does the need to integrate across sectors impact on policy formulation? Drawing on our original analysis of the official documentation and extant literature, we argue that the Commission has responded disproportionately when confronted with the exogenous pressure from member states, public opinion or other IOs to reduce the insulation of policy sectors and the policy autonomy of Directorate Generals. However, this is not just a story of principals (the member states) and agents (the Commission). We explain over-reaction by using the concept of collective organizational memories, that is, the cognitive and normative lenses through which a bureaucracy has learned to respond to exogenous shocks. Throughout its existence, the Commission has responded to attacks on its legitimacy by engaging in heroic policy-making and by over-committing to unrealistic targets (see Cram 2001). This is because the Commission as complex organisation believes that only heroic plans generate the motivation necessary to infuse organizational life with legitimacy. The paper contributes to the literature on policy bubbles by drawing on organizational theory and the literature on collective memories. This way we explore ‘how institutions think’ by looking beyond individual heuristics and biases, anchoring our understanding of over-reaction to deep organizational mechanisms and organizational sense-making.