Interest Group Influence in International Governance: How Citizen Groups Derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

In 2011 and 2012, a total of 31 countries and the European Union (EU) signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which envisages the establishment of stricter standards for the global enforcement of intellectual property rights. Many broad-based and sectoral business associations, including the Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie, the International Chamber of Commerce, and a large number of associations representing the music and film industry, actively supported the agreement. They were opposed by a coalition of (largely) relatively resource-poor and frequently ill-organized citizen groups. Against all odds, the latter managed to win a major victory when in July 2012 an overwhelming majority of the European Parliament voted against the agreement. This result is puzzling as resources are often seen as a major determinant of influence. Moreover, much of the scholarly literature argues that resource-poor groups should find it particularly difficult to have their voices heard on issues negotiated between governments at the international level. What then explains the success of the anti-ACTA campaign? Our response to this question stresses the role of lobbying strategies in determining interest group influence. Citizen groups managed to mobilize the public, forcing business interests to also engage in outside lobbying, a lobbying strategy for which they are ill-prepared. The empirical analysis is based on 80 interviews with groups active on both sides of the ACTA campaign, which we carried out in late 2012 and early 2013. The interviews encompass both national-level groups from five different countries and European-level and transnational actors. The paper not only contributes to the literatures on lobbying and transnational actors, but also provides one of the first scholarly analyses of the ACTA campaign.