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Engaging with the Victor’s Peace? A Pragmatic Role for Outsiders in Post-Victory Transitions

Africa
Asia
Conflict
Conflict Resolution
Elites
Developing World Politics
UN
International relations
Giulia Piccolino
Loughborough University
Giulia Piccolino
Loughborough University

Abstract

Many countries have historically recovered from civil wars in ways that substantially deviate from the ‘liberal peace’ template (Weinstein 2005; Soares de Oliveira 2011). A particular case is represented by post-victory transitions in countries such as Rwanda, Angola, Sri Lanka and Côte d’Ivoire. It has been suggested that these countries might be engaging in processes of war-driven statebuilding similar to those that historically took place in Western Europe (Jones, de Oliveira, and Verhoeven 2012; Taylor and Botea 2008; Diaz and Murshed 2013). These processes are the product of “really existing political actors of consequence with really existing political agendas” (Soares de Oliveira 2011: 309) and thus appear more credible than externally sponsored statebuilding. While in the ‘90s the predominant attitude was the “condemnation of all violent conflict by liberal peace” (Duffield 2001: 129) a more pragmatic approach towards victory in civil wars has gradually emerged (Kovacs and Svensson 2013). However, external engagement in post-victory countries is on several respects problematic. The ideological underpinning of post-victory statebuilding is often very removed from the liberal-democratic ethos, drawing from local ideas of (non democratic) statehood and authoritarian transformative ambitions (see for instance the case of Rwanda: Straus and Waldorf 2011; Reyntjens 2013), while outsider’s leverage is limited. Peacebuilders often tend to be divided between those who see “strong, decisive leadership” (Mazarr 2014) behind victors’ assertiveness and those who are alarmed by the exclusivist nature of many post-victory transitions. This paper explores the possibility for a constructive engagement, questioning how statebuilding projects – as opposed to pure consolidation of authoritarian rule – can be individuated and nurtured, and how the international community can advocate the inclusion of the popular constituencies of the defeated party in peacebuilding.