The success of democracy as a universal system for the promotion of human welfare hinges upon one very specific assumption: accountability – that voters will react and protest against corruption, mismanagement and greed. However, evidence from a growing body of literature suggests that this is far from always a reasonable assumption to make. This paper suggests that electoral responses to corruption depend on the type of corruption most prevalent in society. We distinguish between two forms petty corruption (bribery) and nepotism. While nepotism and greed are expected to lead to abstaining from elections (exit), bribery may lead to voting out corrupt incumbents (voice). Most forms of corruption, however, lead to various coping strategies, including loyalty to the incumbent. Using newly collected survey data of 85,000 Europeans in 24 countries, we find support for our claim. Our findings suggest that favoritism have a far more corroding impact on democratic accountability than do direct experiences with petty corruption. The study contributes to a better understanding of why and under what circumstances democratic accountability may contain corruption.
