The Surprising Rationality behind the Diffusion of Mass Uprisings

A rich literature documenting the diffusion of democracy is currently complemented by scholars studying the spatial spread of mass uprisings in authoritarian contexts. Yet, we still know little about the causal mechanisms behind such processes of diffusion. In two influential articles Kurt Weyland (2009, 2012) argues that the diffusion of protests in 1848 and during the “Arab Spring” is driven by mass psychological cues lacking any element of rationality. In contrast to Weyland we take a rational (game theoretical) perspective and argue that mass uprisings in one country can provide for valuable and rational information about the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes in other, neighbouring countries. According to our model the diffusion of protests should be related to increased vulnerability of authoritarian regimes during waves of protest diffusion leading to higher rates of regime failure, economic or political concessions or an increase in the level of repression. We test our hypotheses using cross-national panel data for authoritarian countries. The explanatory variables are protests and the (spatial, social, and economic) proximity of authoritarian regimes. We measure the effect on four dependent variables, namely the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, political liberalisation, economic failure, and the increased spending for security apparatus.