Agency or Structure? Explaining Variations of Suburban Local Governance in a Federalist Setting

Public choice theorists claim local decisions as responsible for economic development in metropolitan areas. Others however hold structural conditions accountable for processes as social segregation. I investigate the interplay between local political agency and structural pressure as conditions for the emergence of different forms of governance in a qualitative study of nine Swiss municipalities. I show firstly that “liberal” governance emerges by either the choice of local public politicians to only be controllers of basic zoning rules; or as the result of lacking administrative professionalization and/or favourable socio-economic situations. Secondly, “interventionist” governance is heavily dependent on administrative-political professionalization when intervening in private development projects. “Active” governance additionally needs full-time politicians perceiving public purchases and development of land as the only possibility to stop the vicious cycle of rising tax levels in unfavourable economic situations. Local agency in highly federalist settings seems to be important, but heavily dependent on structural conditions.