The Politics of Emergency in the EU

The purpose of this paper is to draw on the literature on the state of exception (Agamben 2005, Honig 2009) in order to shed light on the systemic implications of the handling of the crisis in the Eurozone for the operation of the European Union (White 2015). It seeks to show how – while the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007) had reinforced the Community method (and the new German coalition government also affirmed its centrality in the process of integration (CDU/CSU/SPD 2013)) and extended its scope – the crisis has been used to enhance the intergovernmental and technocratic elements of the EU’s institutional architecture to the detriment of the openly political institutions. Particular attention will be paid to (a) the strategic use of time which has been turned from a source of pressure into an instrument for the production of enduring, quasi-permanent arrangements and (b) the policy instruments – never an apolitical matter (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004) – utilised in the management of the crisis. Moreover, the role ascribed to the public/citizenry will be compared to the one played by politicians and the mismatch between these politicians’ national basis for legitimation on the one hand, and the pan-European implications of their decision on the other. The broader objective of this paper is to contribute to the growing debate on both the Community method (Dehousse 2011) and the politicisation of European integration (Hix 2008).