Political Accountability in the EU’s Economic and Financial Crisis Management

The proposed paper examines what provisions for political accountability are introduced in EU economic and financial management, and what accounts for the variation in accountability. The EU’s regulatory framework, established to deal with the effects of the financial and economic crisis, is highly fragmented. It presents a mixture of intergovernmental treaties, binding acts, and coordination measures. The crisis has also resulted in a new type of decision-making mode in the economic area, characterised by intergovernmental decision-making and supranational implementation. Unlike the ‘pure’ intergovernmental and community methods, the post-crisis decision-making mode is not linked to 'traditional' parliamentary and legal accountability structures. This may lead to shortcomings in the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s economic governance. Yet, in the legislative process, a range of formal provisions and informal practices have been introduced to hold the implementing institutions to account, particularly put on the agenda by the European Parliament. In this paper, we examine the accountability structures in place in the financial and economic area, addressing the question how we can account for the variation across crisis measures, looking at such factors as the degree of involvement of the Parliament in the legislative process and the nature of the measures.