Kant’s Cosmopolitan Right and the Right to Exclusion

Since in the current debate on citizenship and migration in political philosophy Kant is often perceived as a key figure of cosmopolitanism, the question whether we find a normative basis for exclusion in Kant’s work has often been neglected. In my talk I will argue that Kants cosmopolitan right can be read in a way that allows for a normativ basis of exclusion. As Eberl and Niesen (2011: 260ff.) pointed out, in the literature on the cosmopolitan right we find three distinct positions concerning the normative basis of this right. According to the first interpretation, the cosmopolitan right can be deduced from Kant's conception of the one innate right (Kleingeld 1998, Benhabib 2005). The second interpretation claims that the cosmopolitan right is in fact a right to membership in a global political community, that is to say a right to having the status of an active citizen (Held 1996). The third interpretation, however, suggests that the cosmopolitan right is based on certain observations about the empirical conditions of human existence - in particular the sphericality of the earth (Flikschuh 2000). In my talk I will show that there is in fact strong evidence in Kant for a reading of the cosmopolitan right along the lines of the third interpretation. I will then argue that this interpretation also leaves room for refuge and asylum as well as for the right of political communities to exclusion.