When a Colegislator does not Codecide: The European Parliament and the Reform of the EMU

This paper argues that the de jure empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) and the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure should not be always equated with the de facto impact of the EP on the legislative outputs. It focuses on the two most important legislative packages that, under the ordinary legislative procedure, contributed to the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union: the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack. On the bases of official documents, reports of the specialized press, and thirty-four original interviews with key decision-makers, it tracks the development of the legislative negotiations and compares the final legislative output with the legislative proposal and its amended versions. It is suggested that the EP may punch below its weight in ‘exceptional times’, that is when a crisis compels the EU to act swiftly and the EP to behave responsibly; in policy areas linked to ‘core state powers’, that is when the European Council takes the lead and makes its presence felt during the legislative negotiations; and when a policy is ‘new’ to codecision, that is when the EP needs to be socialized into the field. This paper challenges the common wisdom on the role of the EP in the Six and the Two-Pack, which considers it an influential player for the democratization of the EMU