Outcome-Based Legitimation Strategies under Non-Democratic Rule. Re-Examining the ‘Electoral Authoritarianism’ Advantage Hypothesis

I focus on Svolik’s “problem of authoritarian control”, and on rulers’ ability to solicit support and cooperation from society through policy performance. Support and cooperation are goals that any political leader different from Olson’s “roving bandit” should have in great consideration. Legitimation secures support and compliance with the regime's rules. In practice, a regime is legitimate if people believe it to be so. This belief can originate from a variety of sources. Easton distinguish between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support, the latter being connected to the performance of the political system. Concerning diffuse support, autocracies are structurally disadvantaged, as they lack representative institutions empowering citizens. Other sources of diffuse support – e.g. ideology, traditional values and norms – are increasingly rare. Autocrats are thus forced to justify their authority through more ‘specific’ strategies of legitimation, typically involving the provision of public goods. Under non-democracy, in other words, policy performance is not only one of the alternative sources of legitimation but one of the most salient. In this respect, it has been recently demonstrated that electoral authoritarian regimes outperform more closed dictatorships and are better able to deliver public goods. Electoral authoritarian institutions trigger informational mechanisms that enable rulers to intervene in the public sector efficiently and address citizens’ needs. The ‘electoral authoritarianism advantage’ hypothesis needs further assessment. The first issue is the remaining institutional heterogeneity characterizing the full/closed authoritarian category. Do electoral autocracies outperform any type of closed dictatorship? A second issue refers to the existence of alternative explanations. Do electoral authoritarian institutions ‘enable’ incumbent leaders, improving their ability to solicit outcome-based legitimation; or do these institutions ‘constrain’ rulers, forcing them to invest more? Alternatively, is it possible that electoral autocracies’ superior performance is driven by more competitive forms of electoral authoritarianism, where governments are forced to sweat to hold office?