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Committee Assignments in Parliaments with Strong Party Groups - An Analysis of the Bundestag, the Tweede Kamer and Dáil Éirann

Comparative Politics
Democracy
European Politics
Parliaments
Tim Mickler
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden
Tim Mickler
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden

Abstract

Objective: In this paper, I analyze the allocation of legislators to committees in three parliaments with strong parliamentary party groups (PPGs). Committees are, together with PPGs, the basis for the internal organization of parliaments and the prime organizational structure to prepare plenary sessions and documents. Committees are privileged decision-making arenas which, at least theoretically, offer "property rights" in a policy area: Once assigned, committee members have a claim to work on issues within their jurisdiction. It is therefore important to understand which factors influence this assignment process within PPGs. Method: The analysis focuses on the assignment procedure in the Bundestag, the Tweede Kamer and Dàil Èirann. The analysis spans multiple legislative periods (Germany: 1994 – 2013; the Netherlands 1994 – 2012; Ireland: 1992 – 2011) and focuses on specialized, jurisdiction-specific committees. The theoretical framework for the study consists of the congressional theories of legislative organization and the 'keeping tabs on coalition partners' perspective. All theories are discussed with regard to their limitations and are used as heuristic devices to deduct several rationales of the assignment process. The role of PPGs is highlighted. The hypotheses are tested by means of a multiple membership multilevel model. The results are backed up with evidence from 101 interviews with legislators I conducted in the three parliaments. Result: The statistical model and the interviews highlights the presence of several factors which increase the likelihood of being assigned to a committee. Across all countries, there is strong evidence that a legislator’s educational and occupational background matters most in the assignment process. There are notable differences across the three cases with regard to several other variables. For the ongoing discussion about the applicability of the congressional theories outside of the U.S. my study provides evidence for the usefulness of the U.S. theories.