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Explaining Patterns of Legislative Organization in Subnational Parliaments

Comparative Politics
Federalism
Parliaments
Institutions
Sebastian Bukow
Heinrich Böll Foundation
Sebastian Bukow
Heinrich Böll Foundation

Abstract

Legislatures are organized in different ways. Differences appear e.g. in the regulation of parliamentary rights and the intra-organizational distribution of resources (e.g. funding, staff). The latter allows the legislature to strengthen specific actors, e.g. organisational units (e.g. parliamentary groups, committees) or the individual MPs. As we know, it does make a difference, e.g. for legislators behaviour, which dimension of a legislature is strengthened. Due to that it is most relevant to know more about the reasons behind this process of legislative self-organisation. We can assume that different organizational patterns do not simply occur, they are much more a result of legislatures’ decisions. This will be analysed in the proposed paper. The paper addresses the different patterns of legislative organization, referring to resources and the question, where resources are allocated in a legislature (e.g. groups, committees, MPs) and how differences can be explained. The paper draws on a non-formal model that is based on the rationalist variant of the new institutionalism. Consequently, different patterns can be seen as a result of legislatures’ and legislators’ decisions, but these decisions are influenced by institutional aspects (e.g. party competition, electoral and political system). The model will be tested with new cross-sectional data, referring to the intra-organisational distribution of resources in subnational parliaments in federal parliamentary systems (esp. Germany). This design allows to control for a specific set of institutional variables but offers variance of independent and dependent variables as well. The paper is embedded in a larger research project that analyses the institutional development of parliaments and that will include a broader set of (sub)national legislatures in all types of European democracies at a later project stage. Due to that, discussing the paper at the ECPR Joint Sessions will be most fruitful for the paper, the project and the workshop.