ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Denying Opportunities to Prevent Regret

Political Theory
Social Welfare
Freedom
Mollie Gerver
The London School of Economics & Political Science
Mollie Gerver
The London School of Economics & Political Science

Abstract

Sometimes, the vast majority of recipients of a service later regret accepting the service. For example, many soldiers later regret having had the opportunity to enlist; many patients later regret having had the opportunity to accept a particular treatment; many students later regret having had the opportunity to enrol in a given university; and many refugees later regret receiving the opportunity to repatriate. Sometimes, based on this regret, we can predict that future recipients of the opportunity will also likely regret receiving this opportunity. It is not clear if this future regret is a reason to deny the opportunity if, at the time of the opportunity, individuals have given their full and informed consent. In some cases, it seems regret ought to play no role in determining if an opportunity is provided. Many feel that every woman ought to have equal access to abortion services regardless of future regret. For this reason, no country in the world – with the exception of the United States – denies abortions solely based on predicting a woman’s future regret. Other cases of regret, however, are not like abortions, with different features, and possibly different implications. I argue that future regret is a reason to deny an opportunity if three conditions are met. First, most past recipients of a service must feel that the best life they could now live is worse than the worst life they could have lived, had they not accepted the opportunity. Second, this regret must be from the opportunity alone, and not from other prior and subsequent choices. In other words, though multiple opportunities may on the aggregate cause regret, this is not a reason to deny a particular opportunity. Finally, the service must lead to an outcome where nearly every life experience is different than the experiences recipients had before accepting the service. Such is the case, for example, when a refugee repatriates from a relatively safe country, to a country that lacks security, basic infrastructure, and access to healthcare. When life will become radically different in such a way, then the recipients of the opportunity will struggle to imagine what life will be like as a result of accepting this opportunity, and so will struggle to be informed about the outcome of their choice. I argue that these three conditions are not met when women regret having an abortion, students regret enrolling in a university, and other life choices, but these conditions may be met when soldiers regret enlisting, refugees regret repatriating and patients regret receiving some treatments. Even if we accept that regret is a reason to deny an opportunity, it is not clear what ought to be done in cases where individuals are likely to both regret accepting the opportunity, and also regret rejecting the opportunity. In such cases the opportunity should be denied if those who accept it are more likely to regret their decision compared to those who reject the opportunity.