Role Conceptions of Parliamentary Party Leaders in the Belgian ‘Partitocracy’: A Neo-Institutional Framework for Analysis

Political parties are organizations with their own internal life and politics (Laver & Shepsle, 1999; Katz, 1995). According to Katz & Mair (2002), they consist of multiple interacting ‘faces’, being: the ‘party on the ground’ (party in relation to the public), ‘party in central office’ (central party organization) and ‘party in public office’ (party in parliament and government). Research has mainly focused on the ‘party on the ground’ while the other two faces and their interrelationships have often been neglected. In Belgium, the position of parliamentary party group leaders (PPG leaders) is highly relevant when studying the relation between the two latter ‘faces’. Unlike in other countries, they are not simultaneously the extra-parliamentary party chairman, nor the overall party leader, but rather act as intermediaries between the central party elite (‘party in central office’) and the parliamentary party group (PPG) (‘party in public office’) (Cross & Pilet, 2014; De Winter, 1992). As such they are ‘agents’ with two ‘principals’ (Pitkin, 1967). On the one hand, they can act on behalf of the party elite, transmitting their decisions to the legislature and ensuring PPG discipline. On the other hand, they can represent the PPG members by furthering their wishes and grievances to key central party actors. Our project aims to explore the role orientations of Belgian PPG leaders by investigating to which of both ‘principals’ they give priority and what factors (related to time, personal and party characteristics) influence this choice. In our paper, we will present a theoretical and analytical framework for studying these roles. We will provide an overview of the existing literature on PPGs, their leaders and the role and purpose of parties in the legislature. Additionally, we will place PPG leadership in comparative perspective by examining the role of this position in other European democracies, and by indicating the intricacies of the Belgian case. Moreover, as we will study PPG’s leaders’ ‘roles’, we will discuss the state of the art in the re-emerging field of ‘legislative roles’ by analyzing how roles are constructed and how they can be measured. In accordance with neo-institutionalist approaches on parliamentary roles (e.g. Searing, 1994; Strøm, 1997) we adhere to the idea that roles are shaped by the institutional context in which legislators operate (i.e. formal and informal rules and expectations) as well as by individual preferences (i.e. emotional and career-related incentives) and have repercussions on actual parliamentary behavior. We disagree, however, to the limited part attributed to individual choice in leadership roles (e.g. Whips, Speakers, PPG leaders) which, according to these authors, are almost completely determined by institutions. We will argue that also PPG leaders have some leeway in defining their roles and that, depending on personal motivations and the weight of (in)formal rules, they could either bend towards being an agent for the party elite, or a representative of the PPG. As this paper tackles an important aspect of how (extra-parliamentary) parties may influence parliamentary decision-making, we believe it would fit best in a panel on ‘parties and legislative output’.