In this presentation I will focus on Serbia’s European Union integration process from a national identity framework. I will demonstrate how the EU does not fit the Serbian ethno-national imaginary and integration is thus framed as a need for Serbia. For a country that is not doing well economically, has high levels of corruption and living conditions are worsening, EU membership seemed like a step towards progress. However, integration has been slow and changes small, and Serbian citizen support for membership has been dropping. The institution now seems fragile and its unity is questioned. As the section abstract states, some member states are discussing independence while simultaneously wishing to remain in the EU, while others are suggesting leaving the institution. The financial crisis and now the ‘migration crisis’ are also pushing member states to prioritize national interests. Its unity and success are no longer certain. This uncertainty is feeding to the already difficulty Serbia has had identifying with Europe and the EU. Analysing Belgrade’s museums and school curricula, I demonstrate the representations of Europe (and essentially the EU) as a powerful entity that has taken advantage of Serbia in the past. This raises suspicion of its decision for expanding. An emphasis on Serbia’s ‘traditional’ and ‘hereditary’ national markers also point Serbia away from Western Europe. Tradition, memories, language, the alphabet, and religion are only some of the markers that push it to the Orthodox East region instead. Claims to primordialism are common in Serbian national identity discourse, suggesting Serbia has an unquestioned bond with other Orthodox and Eastern European nations. The claims also suggest fundamental and inherent difference between Serbia and Western Europe. The tensions between Russia and other EU member states further push this difference, with states such as Serbia receiving pressure from both ‘sides’. Despite this, Serbian political elites are arguing in favour of EU integration. Membership is presented as a need for the state and its people. There is no attempt to make Serbia part of the European imaginary by them, just an offer of a better future. Through interviews I conducted, my informants had a similar discourse. While they were critical of the EU and its show of power, some hoped that it will make the state a functional one. Again, the institution is a change that Serbia needs. For Serbia, integration seems nearest now that the endurance of the EU is uncertain.
