David and Goliath. Toward a Theory of Conflict and Co-operation among Unequal Neighbours

When large, globally influential states share borders with smaller states, they either cooperate in a lot of policy fields or clash in equally comprehensive conflict, sometimes even war. But why is there sometimes bitter conflict and sometimes intense cooperation? Conflict between unequal neighbors is a recurring phenomenon with major implications for the security and welfare of not just the two respective states, but also for their surrounding regions and sometimes, as with Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia in 1914, for the whole world. As Russia's role in the wars against Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine from 2014 on illustrates, such conflict remains highly relevant for international politics. And it will remain so, as China's increasing assertiveness in Southeast Asia and the increasingly hostile and fearful discourse among its neighbors testifies. This paper lays the foundation for a theory of the causes and conditions of conflict and cooperation between unequal neighbors. For this purpose, it evaluates a broad range of theories that have been hitherto proposed. The paper does so by using conceptual critique as well as structured, focused and comparative plausibility probes into Russo-Ukrainian relations 1990-2015; Russo-Belarusian relations 1990-2015; Sino-Vietnamese relations 1975-2000 and Sino-North Korean relations 1975-2000. No comprehensive theory of relations between unequal neighbors has yet been proposed. The paper therefore discusses relevant implications of constructivist, institutionalist and liberal contributions on the topic, but argues that these contributions lack theoretical unity and are insufficient in terms of explanatory power. Turning to realist approaches, the paper finds that a major amount of variation in conflict and cooperation between unequal neighbors is accounted for by regional and global differentials in certain state capabilities combined with a desire of states for security, understood in a broad way. However, the paper also reveals several crucial shortcomings in terms of scope, determinacy and explanatory power in these realist approaches: first, there is no comprehensive general account of the main drivers behind relations between unequal neighbors; second, realists disagree strongly on several crucial aspects of these relations, such as the role of intentions, information, balancing and the utility of force and coercion; third, the main variable usually employed – the small neighbor's power defined as a monadic state attribute, usually solely as military capability – often covers up more than it reveals. Finally, to take some first steps towards rectifying these realist shortcomings, the paper proposes an improved realist variable accounting for how global and interstate distributions of power condition the relations between unequal neighbors. It thereby introduces a relational and comprehensive concept of interstate coercive power. Building on a prominent research tradition ranging from the classic accounts of Max Weber, Robert Dahl and Hans Morgenthau to the contemporary thought of David Baldwin, the paper explains, first, how such a variable can be operationalized for systematic testing; second, how it improves on what has been proposed by realists so far and; third, how it avoids the fallacy, prominently criticized by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, to conflate causes with outcomes.