Described by The Economist as the “shining light of Europe” in 1997, Ireland experienced an economic boom that saw it transform from being one of the EU’s poorest member states in 1973 to one of its wealthiest. Nearly twenty years after that shining description, the ailing Irish economy
had to be rescued by the Troika. Today, Ireland is the “poster child” for austerity. Unlike other
troubled peripheral economies, Irish policy makers were more receptive to the Troika’s austere policy perceptions. In 2014, the Republic was the first peripheral economy to exit the joint IMF-EU bailout mechanism. But in doing so Irish policy makers were effectively forced into adhering to the EU’s Ordo-liberal orthodoxies through the conditions linked to financial aid. This paper will examine this issue through a theoretical lens of New Constitutionalism, and argue that the case of Ireland challenges both existing understandings of Irish attitudes towards conditionality and wider understandings of austerity. Furthermore, this paper will argue that in light of the Eurozone crisis, the case study of Ireland suggests that there has been a greater shift towards New Constitutionalism within the Eurozone; that is, states are effectively bound through the conditionalities of their respective bailouts to adhere to the EU’s Ordo-liberal orthodoxies. This has been demonstrated through the abandonment of Social Partnership within Ireland, a key aspect of its national model of capitalism which contradicted the Ordo-liberal orthodoxy of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In conclusion, Irish attitudes towards austerity were conditioned and influenced by these restraints as the post-crisis model of economic governance within the EMU left little room for renegotiation, contestation and reform for peripheral member states.
