Leader Effects of Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Elections

Research on the influence of party leaders in elections has moved towards a closer examination of the factors which condition their leader effect. Empirical studies have shown that micro as well as macro factors condition the magnitude of leader effects. However two possible factors of conditionality have so far been barely addressed by the literature: The relationship between candidate and government evaluation, as well as structural differences party leaders. In this paper I will examine how those two factors condition leader effects of party leaders who re-run for office. With regard to these findings I will draw conclusions for a more accurate measurement and more profound understanding of leader effects. The literature has early discussed the need to judge candidates separately from their party and if applicable from their government to measure only the direct effect of a candidate's personality on the vote choice. The need for separate judgement from the government is of especial importance if the party leader is a prime minister campaigning for an additional term. Firstly, as the evaluation of a candidate is intertwined with the evaluation of the candidate's party, the evaluation of a prime minister is intertwined with the evaluation of the prime minister's government. The probability is high, that who likes the government also likes the prime minister. Secondly prime ministers running for re-election are likely to have several structural advantages over their opposing candidates: For example they are constantly present in the public media and may be known by a higher percentage of the electorate than their opponents. These advantages are not based on the prime ministers personality, but stem from the fact that they hold a high political office prior to the election. Overall the leader effect of re-running prime ministers may be greater in magnitude than the leader effect of their opponents. However this difference originates not necessarily from their personality, but due to their structural advantages and affiliation with the government. It therefore seems likely that the leader effects of re-running prime ministers, as well as other prime ministerial candidates which were closely affiliated with the government, have been overestimated by the literature. Prime ministers competing for another time in office are no deviant cases. The majority of prime ministers re-run for office after their first term. Therefore in many elections a prime minister is competing for another term in office. Using survey data from several parliamentary systems I investigate the connection between government evaluation and leader effects. I develop a leader effect model that takes government evaluation into account and addresses structural differences between re-running prime ministers and competing party leaders. Furthermore I will compare this model to common leader effect models.