Social coalitions, austerity and responsive vs. responsible government

What determines whether a government is more responsive or responsible during thequasi experiment of austerity (2010-14)? I explore this dilemma in two (al)most similarcountries with different outcomes, the UK and France. Contrary to common knowledge,the UK and France share important characteristics that are usually mechanisms explainingwhether a government is responsive or responsible during austerity (fiscal institutions,partisanship, economic structure). Yet, both countries opted for opposed fiscal policiesduring austerity, despite being governed by right-wing parties: the UK cut spendingwith great “responsibility”, reducing the welfare state almost to its post-war levels andincreasing inequality and precarity. France, on the contrary, barely cut expenditures andincreased taxes, becoming one of the most heavily taxed economy in the OECD.I explain this counter-intuitive outcome by focusing on the embeddedness of socialcoalitions in tax linkages and inequality levels. I argue that where tax systems promotestrong linkages between payments and benefits, social groups prefer tax hikes to spendingcuts because they do not want to forgo benefits for which they have already paid. Ifthose tax linkages are weak, social groups are more likely to resist tax hikes because ofuncertainty. Second, where social groups are equal, they are more likely to agree on highertaxes because of a fair additional tax burden: if incomes are equal, taxes are likely to beequal. Where inequality prevails, wars of attrition undermine consensus for tax hikes.In interaction, these two mechanisms yield ideal-types embodied by the UK and France.Countries such as the UK with weak tax linkages and high inequality are more likely tobe “responsible” and cut spending. Conversely, countries which, like France, have strongtax linkages and low inequality are more likely to be “responsive” and increase taxes toprotect social spending.These findings have important implications for the literature on partisan politics andpolicy-making. I suggest that where tax linkages are weak and attrition is high, right wingparties have a political advantage and left wing parties lose if their are not “responsible”.Conversely, where tax linkages are strong and attrition is low, left wing parties have anadvantage and right wing parties have to be “responsive” to stay legitimate.