Poor economic performance is often associated with declining popular support for autocratic regimes. In this study, we qualify this argument by contending that nominally democratic institutions can help authoritarian regimes to compensate for the loss of performance-based legitimacy. In particular, we propose that elections generate legitimacy to the degree that they give citizens the feeling of being legally empowered to choose their political representatives. We present a nominal typology of authoritarian elections, arguing that the range of political choices available to the voters affects their perceptions of having genuinely chosen their representatives. It is thus not the act of voting itself, but having a choice of candidates and parties on the ballot that influences popular judgements about the regime’s legitimacy. Combining individual-level data from the World Value Surveys with comparative macro-level indicators, we rely on longitudinal multilevel modelling to test whether institutions-based legitimacy counterbalances a decrease in performance-based legitimacy due to economic recession and rising unemployment. By focusing on systematic differences in the setup of authoritarian elections, our study clarifies how and under which conditions nominally democratic institutions serve to legitimise autocratic rule. Our findings have important implications for the study of legitimacy, institutions, and policy performance in authoritarian regimes.
