Influence of Rankings in Development Aid: Emergence of the International Aid Transparency Initiative

While global rankings’ influence on transparency policies of aid receiving countries has been explored to some detail, we analyze a novel development, where donor countries commit to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). What makes this case interesting is the observation that donor countries appear to change their practices of governing without an apparent need to do so. Hypothesizing that a concern over prestige lays behind this behavior, we inquire how rankings serve as tools of diffusion and influence national policies and practices. Thus, we concentrate on the policy implications of rankings and ask (1) whether norm promoters can use them as tools to promote their preferences and (2) how competition for prestige and reputation embodied by ranking scores functions as a mechanism in diffusion of transparency initiatives? The IATI is a relatively recent international platform for ensuring easy access and public transparency for tracking the use of development funds by donors globally. The IATI framework builds on existing data, such as the OECD database, and on information it receives from its members, that encompass 27 states, including most important donor countries, international organizations, such as the EU and the World Bank, and hundreds of NGOs. Participation in IATI is voluntary, yet the initiative has mainstreamed in a very short period of time. Diffusion, the spread of norms and practices from one country or region to another has been theorized as being the result of learning, shaming, coercion, and persuasion. There is general understanding that advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and powerful states act as agents of diffusion when it comes to the promotion of international norms and practices, such as the IATI. The case of IATI shows that, instead of resorting to traditional tools of norm promotion, norm promoters motivate states into implementing the policy initiative with the symbolic value of succeeding in an aid transparency ranking. This potentially has the implication that competition for prestige in rankings serves as a mechanism of policy diffusion. In terms of the logic of the norm life cycle, it can be argued that an NGO-coalition, gathered under the umbrella of the ‘Publish What You Fund’-initiative (PWYF), together with like-minded states played an important role in the establishment of the IATI. Our research points out that the PWYF uses its ‘Aid Transparency Index’-ranking (ATI) as a means to influence states’ commitment to the IATI. We also have primary source evidence that important donors monitor their ATI ranking and work to enhance their performance. While commenting their scores at the ATI, these countries remarkably mention their participation to the IATI. Furthermore, compliance with IATI standards directly improves a donor’s position in the ATI, giving additional impetus for implementing the standard. In short, states are interested in their performance and the potential prestige and reputation created by a good placing.