The EU, Cartel Parties and Cartel Capitalism: The case of Troika and Greece

It is my thesis developed in this Paper focusing on the case of Troika and Greece that Cartel Parties are epiphenomena of the larger phenomenon, Cartel Capitalism, and that the features of Cartel Parties as Richard Katz analyses them at the micro-level, are generally reflected in the larger phenomenon at the macro level. Cartel parties reflect the general decline of parties and ideological differences between parties. They use state subventions to favour the parties in power, which engage in rent-seeking behavior and aim to stay in power at all costs. They limit competition to ensure electoral success and collude to keep items like social welfare off the policy agenda. Following the logic of Neoliberal economic cartels, they favour the privatization of social services. They shift redistribution from productive sectors to the bond holders, not poor to rich. And they shift arbitration to non-political entities like Central Banks, the EU Commission, and the courts. Finally, they disempower activists. The consequence is what we see in the EU today: the rule of elites and everywhere a populist backlash. Keywords: Cartel Parties, Cartel Capitalism, EU, Rent-Seeking, Neoliberalism.