The Two Faces of Presidential Veto Power: A Benevolent Force for Social and Public Good, or a Malevolent Force, Blocking Progress, Circumventing Scrutiny

This paper seeks to provide a conceptual theoretical review of the role Presidents veto power has played now, and is likely to play in the future in European countries (International IDEA, ‘Constitution Building Primers’, May 2015, p2). This paper seeks to demonstrate, that Presidential veto power is a force both for social good and political evil. This paper’s literature search seeks to establish that there are various commonalities regarding Presidents and veto power (Tebaldi, 2014, p577). Commonalities which have steered the trajectory of how Presidential veto power has developed in European countries during the post-war period (Grimaldi, 2015, p77). This paper intends to provide comparative studies along the following lines. European countries who have experienced recent political upheaval since 1990, are more likely to have a formal Presidential veto. Whereas European countries who have enjoyed more political stability from 1990 onwards, will either have informal Presidents veto power or little veto power at all (Sedelius and Mashtaler, 2013, p110). This paper aims to establish that qualitative analysis of secondary data sets, will demonstrate that Presidents veto power has delivered welfare provision (European Council of Foreign Relations, 2015, p5). Similarly, qualitative research interviews will also establish that Presidential veto has occurred in some European countries, which has disenfranchised women, perpetuating gender inequality (Cengiz, 2014, p2). This paper seeks to demonstrate that socio-historical factors and cultural background, have a significant influence on Presidential veto powers (Cole, ‘Presidential Power’ Project, 8 February 2016). There are European examples where ethnic minority discrimination continues, despite a Presidential ruling to the contrary, due to historical cultural practices (Freedom House, ‘Nations in Transit’, Reports, 2015). The paper posits that Presidents veto powers are limited in European countries, due to an increase in coalition governments producing more politically neutral behaviour (Bucur, 2015, p5).