How Different Forms of Corruption Affect Electoral Accountability

How Different Forms of Corruption Affect Electoral Accountability Theories of corruption propose two contrasting effects on electoral accountability. It may stimulate people to vote to punish corrupt politicians through protest voting or it may demobilize electors and reduce turnout by generating a belief that politicians cannot be held accountable for their actions. Our paper will test these alternatives with fresh survey data from Britain, France and Spain, three countries in which perceived corruption differs and having recent high visibility corruption cases. Two measures of corruption focus on the behaviour of civil servants not accountable through the ballot box and three involve elected office holders. Respondents are asked to assess three forms of corruption: MPs taking bribes, breaking standards by saying one thing and doing the other (hypocristy) and by bringing a public office into disrepute by public drunkenness, drug taking or sexual indiscretions. We will use the data to test whether people who see elected or unelected officeholders behaving corruptly are less likely to vote or to vote differently and whether forms of corruption differ in their effect on voters. We will also test whether politicians perceived as hypocrites are more likely to be punished by electors voting for another party; not voting; or to continue to receive support on other grounds. The results of our analysis, which is sitll in progress, will contribute to a much more nuanced view of the relation between different forms of corruption and accountability to citizens.