ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Administrative and parliamentarian lobbyism practices at the domestic level within Europeanised policies. The Danish Food and Agriculture

Government
Institutions
Interest Groups
Sevasti Chatzopoulou
University of Roskilde
Sevasti Chatzopoulou
University of Roskilde

Abstract

Although de-corporatisation has been claimed the recent years, especially within the traditionally Nordic corporatist countries, the role of interest organisations in policy making at the national and the transnational level remains significant. The article argues that interest organisations role and practices may also differ among the different policy areas. This article investigates the role of the Danish Food and Agriculture Council (DFAC) that operates within a particularly Europeanised policy area, the CAP and asks to what extent the EU CAP affected the strong relations between the DFAC and the state and more specifically with the administration over time. The DFAC is an umbrella interest organisation that represents both the primary agriculture and the agri-food sector. DFAC became, over time, the nodal point that links actors at all levels within a strong agricultural policy network in Denmark. These links contributed to the development considerable adaptive capacities to external challenges within DFAC which are reflected in its lobbying practices over time. Danish agriculture is subject to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) rules since 1973. Despite changing circumstances and policy reforms over time, the DFAC-state relations remain clearly defined, highly institutionalised, intensive, frequent and strongly corporatist. They combine deliberation, cooperation and negotiation on conflicting interests also indicating a shift from parliamentarian to administrative corporatism. Moreover, these interactions focus on the implementation and effective administration of the CAP decisions. The analysis is based on qualitative data gathered through a series of interviews over time both within the organisation and the administration but also relevant actors in the sector. This data are combined with official documents and reports. It is shown that despite the expansion of lobbying activities of the DFAC at the EU level, and changes in governments at the domestic level, the agricultural corporatist structures remain intact at the domestic level. This is attributed to high professionalization and the institutional embeddedness of the organisation in the governance system over time. Moreover, the DFAC has developed an adaptability capacity which allows it to develop various forms of lobbyism strategies and practices, administrative or parliamentarian depending on the issues and adapting to the different governments policies.