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Regulatory Politics and Lobbying: Unpacking the World of Administrative Lobbying

Civil Society
Governance
Interest Groups
Regulation
P357
Caelesta Braun
Departments of Political Science and Public Administration, Universiteit Leiden

Building: Faculty of Arts, Floor: Ground, Room: FA018

Saturday 14:00 - 15:40 CEST (10/09/2016)

Abstract

Influencing the bureaucracy is a significant strategy employed by many interest groups across nation states and multiple levels of governance. Being there when policy proposals are drafted, when regulatory norms are being developed, or when advice is being given to political superiors is a crucial step in almost any influence strategy. Yet, we know relatively little about the mechanisms of ‘administrative lobbying’. Is administrative lobbying a world apart or similar to any other kind of political strategy? What are its (democratic) implications and associations with well-known phenomena of regulatory capture, revolving doors and the alleged structural power of business? The panel will assess to what extent interest groups approach bureaucracies of multiple types and shapes, ranging from core ministerial departments to regulatory agencies, and situated at different levels of governance, from international to national bureaucracies. The panel is open to both theoretical/conceptual and empirical papers adopting various research designs as well as comparative papers that include variation across venues. Theoretical/conceptual papers should aim to present fresh or novel approaches, or synthesize existing thinking. Conceptual papers could also address normatively-inspired analyses such as the democratic implications of non-elected actors such as interest groups and bureaucrats working together or the relationship with regulatory capture or the issue of revolving doors. Empirical papers should be theoretically informed, rely on systematic research designs and test hypotheses by using rigorous qualitative and/or quantitative research methods

Title Details
Emancipation of the underrepresented? Explaining access to EU regulatory agencies’ advisory committees View Paper Details
Ex-parte lobbying in regulatory policy-making: Assessing access and advocacy success View Paper Details
Patterns of access: A network analysis of interest groups’ meetings with European Commission officials View Paper Details
The common core of EU lobbying. Explaining lobby presence at multiple EU venues View Paper Details
Administrative and parliamentarian lobbyism practices at the domestic level within Europeanised policies. The Danish Food and Agriculture View Paper Details