The Political Dimensionality of the German Landtage

Legislative behaviour of parliamentarians is the last part of the link between voters and their representatives. Therefore, it is essential to understand the causes and patterns of consensus and conflict between parliamentary groups if we discuss the responsiveness of parties. International research on the dimensionality of legislative voting only comprises a single comparative study by Hix and Noury (2011) besides a few case studies (e.g. Godbout and Høyland 2011; Hansen and Debus 2011; Hix and Jun 2009; Otjes 2011). However, the results are only limited informative because the observation of very different cases introduces various disturbing factors, like different rules regarding roll call votes, into the analysis. Our paper (1) provides new insights into the interaction of parliamentary groups and (2) shows how analytical tools that have been developed in the context of presidential democracies can be transferred to parliamentary democracies with strong parties in a useful way. Using over 2000 roll call votes we assess the political dimensionality of the German Landtage and show, that the dualism between government and opposition is by far the most important conflict line. Yet, depending on their distance to the government opposition party groups also tend to agree with the government of the day. In Eastern Germany we find evidence that the voting behavior is (still) more issue-oriented that in Western Germany. The resulting relative weakness of the government-opposition divide allows for a more complex dimensionality in Eastern Germany. We also show that the logic of issue competition leaves its imprint on the political dimensionality: Niche parties, in particular parties of the extreme right, especially introduce their own line of conflict. Out study advances our understanding of the political dimensionality of parliamentary voting.