Interest groups’ lobbying strategies in China

As indicated in previous research, some of the interest groups in China try hard to represent their members and to have their voice heard in policy-making process. Yet, we still know little about why interest groups do what they do in China. What explains their choice of lobbying strategies? Why do they combine the strategies, if they do so? These are the questions that present some of the literature gaps which this research aims to fulfil. Briefly, the study endeavors to determine whether the differences in the group types and the types of the policy-issue that they enroll in matter in groups’ choice of lobbying strategies. My theoretical expectations derive from the assumption that groups try to influence policy and, at the same time, to gain/maintain their reputation. How much effort groups invest into achieving each of these two goals can be expected to vary depending on groups’ material resources, groups’ autonomy from the party state and the type of policy issue that they involve in. From this theoretical framework, hypotheses that take Chinese institutional context into consideration are developed and tested. Sample of business associations and citizen groups has been randomly selected from the data base that includes associations potentially involved in lobbying. Data are collected through online survey. Bivariate and multivariate analysis gave an answer to question who the insiders are and whether they combine the inside and outside tactics. The findings confirm the theoretical expectations that logic of reputation progresses to logic of influence and resource exchange which functions as a mechanism of transformation from outsider to insider. The research is part of the bigger project with explanatory sequential design in which the above-described quantitative analysis will guide the case selection for qualitative strand that aims to expand on conceptual background of interest groups representation in China.