ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Paternalism and Autonomy

Political Theory
Public Policy
Social Justice
Social Welfare
Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen
Aarhus Universitet
Søren Midtgaard
Aarhus Universitet

Abstract

The boundaries of respect for individual freedom are highly relevant for the justification of public policies. In this context, it is generally accepted that paternalistic restrictions adopted for improving wellbeing imply a lack of respect for autonomy. Conversely, paternalistically motivated policies may prevent severe harm and thereby put people in position to pursue important ends. Therefore, an absolute refusal of paternalism seems to imply a principled acceptance that people are free to do as they wish regardless of the consequences for their future prospects. However, autonomy is an extremely heterogeneous concept and therefore compromises of autonomy may take many forms. At some points, the (un)justifiability of paternalism may depend on the understanding of personal self-determination. Against this background, this paper highlights different understandings of autonomy in order to investigate whether, or to what extent, paternalism conflict with specific conceptions of autonomy.