Moellendorf on Human Rights, the Anti-poverty Principle

Moellendorf outlines and defends a distinctive ethical account of how to respond to dangerous climatic change. Moellendorf intends his book to be an exercise in 'public political philosophy' (p.4): it aims to speak to a wider audience than professional political philosophers. In my contribution I will advance four claims. First, in chapter one of his book, Moellendorf addresses the important and unduly neglected question of 'what is "dangerous" climate change?' How should we determine what is a fair target? He answers it by invoking what he terms the 'Antipoverty Principle' (p.22). I argue that this principle is too narrow, and omits morally relevant harms that result from climate change. Second, Moellendorf criticises a human rights based approach (pp.24-26 and Appendix B). I argue that his objections are unsuccessful and that a human rights approach remains in tact, and indeed that his Antipoverty Principle collapses into a human rights approach. Third, Moellendorf defends a distinctive approach to burden-sharing. I argue that we need more reason to endorse an Ability to Pay approach than he supplies; and seek to suggest the kinds of reasoning needed. I further seek to explain how and why historical responsibility matters. Finally, I conclude by reflecting on what it means to write for a public audience. Taking this role seriously can require a different kind of reasoning and mode of argumentation than the one that Moellendorf practises.