In comparative perspective presidential power is measured either by constitutionally granted powers summarized in various presidential power indexes, or behaviorally by calculating the seat share of pro-presidential parties in national assemblies. Consequently, presidential power changes when constitutions are amended or when majorities change after parliamentary elections. In an in-depth case study on post-Soviet Russia in the years between 1994 – 2012 this paper looks at change of presidential power on the subconstitutional level that has so far mostly been neglected by the literature both in the area studies on post-Soviet countries as well as in comparative politics on presidential powers indexes. In Russia on the constitutional level, change only occurred in 2008 with the extension of the presidential term length. This singular instance of change on the macro-level leads to the research questions of this paper: How did subconstitutional presidential power change and what factors contributed to various pace and depth of change over time? Furthermore, this paper also intends to contribute to a more general research agenda on the role of formal institutions in neopatrimonial regimes. To answer this question I take advantage of the hierarchical structure of Russia’s constitutional system and track change of formal presidential power on the subconstitutional level by means of federal law, presidential decrees and rulings of the Constitutional Court. For the empirical analysis, an original database was compiled which consists of 202 laws, 474 decrees and 175 Constitutional Court rulings that were coded respectively according to time, policy area and degree of expansion of presidential power. The preliminary empirical findings are mixed: As for the rulings of the Constitutional Court a clear threshold could be established in the years around 2002/2003: Before the court would usually rule in a pro-presidential, expansive manner, after the threshold no issues pertaining to constitutional powers of the president were examined by the court any more. As for federal laws and decrees the expansion varies by policy area such as military/security, economy or civil service rather than over time or specific presidents suggesting that expansion of presidential power by laws and decrees has been a constant tool of presidential agenda-setting in post-Soviet Russia.
The last section of the paper explores potential explanatory factors for change of presidential power on the subconstitutional level such as the time that has passed since the adoption of the constitution in 1993, the electoral cycle of presidential and parliamentary elections, the number of pro-presidential parties and seats in the State Duma, first and second terms of presidents, leadership of the three presidents as well as the regime trajectory of Russia from a rather pluralist democratic regime in the 1990s towards electoral authoritarianism in the 2000s. The conclusion summarizes the findings for Russia and the importance for comparative research on the measurement of parchment presidential power which should not neglect subconstitutional change of powers to avoid measurement errors.
